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CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-TERRAN V. SECRETARY OF

HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES: MODIFICATION
OF STATUTES AND THE PRESENTMENT
CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION
INTRODUCTION

In 1986, Congress enacted the National Childhood Vaccine In
jury Act! (the "Vaccine Act") as a means for "compensating indi
viduals ... injured by vaccines routinely administered to children."2
The Vaccine Act contains a Vaccine Injury Table3 ("Initial Injury
Table"), which lists common vaccines, complications normally aris
ing from such vaccines, and time periods within which these compli
cations typically arise. 4 Section 300aa-14(c) also authorizes the
Secretary of Health and Human Services ("Secretary") to periodi
cally review the Initial Injury Table and amend it5 to conform to
current scientific data concerning the complications that typically
arise from vaccine administration. 6 The Secretary did, in fact,
amend the Initial Injury Table in 1995,7 by deleting residual seizure
disorder8 as an injury associated with the DTP vaccine9 and narrow
1. 42 U.S.c. §§ 300aa-l to -34 (1994).
2. H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 1 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6344.
3. 42 U.S.c. § 300aa-14(a) (1994).
4. For example, the Initial Injury Table lists anaphylaxis or anaphylactic shock as
a possible injury associated with the inactivated polio vaccine, with a time period of 24
hours for the first symptom or manifestation of onset of this injury. Id.
5. 42 U.S.c. § 300aa-14(c)(1994).
6. H.R. REP. No. 99-908, § 2114, at 19 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6344, 6360-61.
7. Thereby creating a Revised Vaccine Injury Table ("Revised Injury Table").
8. The Qualifications and Aids to Interpretation subsection of the Vaccine Act,
section 300aa-14(b)(2), provides:
A petitioner may be considered to have suffered a residual seizure disorder if
the petitioner did not suffer a seizure or convulsion unaccompanied by fever
or accompanied by a fever of less than 102 degrees Fahrenheit before the first
seizure or convulsion after the administration of the vaccine involved and if
(A) in the case of a measles, mumps, or rubella vaccine or any combination of
such vaccines, the first seizure or convulsion occurred within 15 days after ad
ministration of the vaccine and 2 or more seizures or convulsions occurred
within 1 year after the administration of the vaccine which were unaccompa
nied by fever or accompanied by a fever of less than 102 degrees Fahrenheit,
and (B) in the case of any other vaccine, the first seizure or convulsion oc
curred within 3 days after the administration of the vaccine and 2 or more
177
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ing the definition of encephalopathy.lO
Approximately four months after the 1995 enactment of the
Revised Injury Table, Michelle Terran (on behalf of minor- Julie F.
Terran) filed a petition for compensation under the Vaccine Act in
the United States Court of Federal Claims. l l Her petition was de
nied on the basis of the Secretary's 1995 revisions to the Initial In
jury TableP Terran subsequently brought suit to challenge the
constitutionality of the Vaccine Act,13 specifically the section of the
act that authorizes the Secretary to amend the Initial Injury Table,
under the theory that this authorization violates the Presentment
. Clause of the Constitution. 14 The Court of Federal Claims denied
seizures or convulsions occurred within 1 year after the administration of the
vaccine which were unaccompanied by fever or accompanied by a fever of less
than 102 degrees Fahrenheit.
42 U.S.c. §300aa-14(b) (2001).
9. The DTP vaccine contains vaccines for diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis. Id.
§ 300aa-14(a).
10. Compare § 300aa-14(b)(3)(A) (defining encephalopathy as "any significant
acquired abnormality of, or injury to, or impairment of function of the brain. Among
the frequent manifestations encephalopathy are focal and diffuse neurological signs,
increased intracranial pressure, or changes lasting at least 6 hours in level of conscious
ness, with or without convulsions ...") with 42 c.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (2000) which states:
An acute encephalopathy is one that is sufficiently severe so as to require
hospitalization .... (A) For children less than 18 months of age who present
without an associated seizure event, an acute encephalopathy is indicated by a
significantly decreased level of consciousness lasting for at least 24 hours.
Those children less than 18 months of age who present .following a seizure
shall be viewed as having an acute encephalopathy if their significantly de
. creased level of consciousness persists beyond 24 hours and cannot be attrib
uted to a postictal state (seizure) or medication .... (C) Increased intracranial
pressure may be a clinical feature of acute encephalopathy in any age
group .... (D) A !'significantly decreased level of consciousness" is indicated
. by the presence of at least one of the following clinical signs for at least 24
hours or greater ... : (1) Decreased or absent response to environment (re
sponds, if at all, only to loud voice or painful stimuli); (2) Decreased or absent
eye contact (does not fix gaze upon family members or other individuals); or
(3) Inconsistent or absent responses to external stimuli (does not recognize
familiar people or things).
Id.
11. Terran v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 95-451V, 1998 WL 55290, at
*1 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 23, 1998). The Vaccine Act states that "[t]he United States Court of
Federal Claims and the United States Court of Federal Claims special masters shall ...
have jurisdiction over proceedings to determine if a petitioner ... is entitled to compen
sation under the [Vaccine Act] and the amount of such compensation." 42 U.S.c.
§ 300aa-12(a) (2001).
12. Terran, 1998 WL 55290, at *6.
13. Terran v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 41 Fed. Cl. 330 (1998), atfd, 195
F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 812 (2000).
14. Id. at 334; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 ("Every Bill which shall have
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Terran's challenge,15 and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir
cuit affirmed. 16
Terran is the seminal case raising the issue of whether the sec
tion of the Vaccine Act that authorizes the Secretary to amend the
Initial Injury Table violates the Presentment Clause of the Constitu
tion. 17 Part I of this note examines both the history of the Vaccine
Act and the jurisprudential history of the Presentment Clause. Part
II of this note discusses the specific circumstances under which Ter
ran filed this challenge. It also contains an analysis of the majority
and dissenting opinions in Terran, comparing these opinions with
prior Presentment Clause case law. Part III of this note analyzes
the issue involved and, in particular, examines whether the Terran
court's constitutional interpretation was accurate in light of separa
tion of powers principles and the nondelegation doctrine. This note
concludes by noting that section 300aa-14(c) of the Vaccine Act
may be an unconstitutional attempt to authorize a member of the
executive branch to exercise strictly legislative power. Finally, it of
fers a congressional alternative.
I.

A.

LEGISLATIVE AND CASE-SPECIFIC HISTORY

Promulgation of the Vaccine Act

Traditionally, the federal government has had the responsibil
ity of preventing the spread of infectious diseases from within and
without the country's borders. 18 Vaccination of children against
deadly and disabling, but preventable, infections has been one of
the most effective public health initiatives this country has ever un
dertaken.1 9 The government's assumption of this role has saved bil
lions of medical and health related dollars, and millions of children
have grown up without the debilitating effects that have taken their
toll on previous generations. 20 Today, through federal support,
passed the House of Representatives'and the Senate, shall, before it become[s] a Law,
be presented to the President of the United States .... ").
15. Terran, 41 Fed. Cl. at 338.
16. Terran v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 195 F.3d 1302, 1317 (Fed. Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 812(2000).
17. See also O'Connell v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 40 Fed. Cl. 891, affd,
217 F.3d 857 (Fed. CiT. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 812 (2000). The same court of
appeals decided O'Connell five days after Terran. [d. The judges aligned exactly as
they did in Terran and issued their majority and dissenting opinions only by reference
to Terran. [d.
18. H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6346.
19. [d. at 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6345.
20. [d. at 4-5, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6344-46.
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state and local health agencies are able to immunize children
against polio, measles, mumps, rubella, diphtheria, pertussis, and
tetanus21 with scientific study underway to prevent other types of
disease.
However, the nation's ability to maintain this level of success
has recently been questioned as previously unknown injuries associ
ated with these vaccines have surfaced. 22 The number of children
injured by vaccines each year is relatively sma1l23 compared with
the number who are not, but serious consequences have resulted
from the DTp24 and other vaccines. 25 For the relatively few injured
children, there was little opportunity for restitution since tort liabil
ity principles often left many victims uncompensated. High transac
tion costs, including attorney's fees and court payments made
litigation unattractive, and lawsuit and settlement negotiations
would take months and even years to complete. 26
Tort litigation has also been costly for vaccine manufacturers.
The growing number of lawsuits caused an increase in liability in
surance, making it impossible in some cases for manufacturers to
obtain insurance. 27 Due to this cost impediment, several vaccine
manufacturers have withdrawn from the market,2s increasing the
price of vaccines dramatically.29
The multitude of uncompensated injuries, coupled with the in
21. Id. at 5, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.AN. 6344, 6346.
22. See H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 4, 6 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344,
6345-46.
23. See NEIL Z. MILLER, IMMUNIZATION THEORY VS. REALITY: ExpOSE ON VAC
CINATIONS 41-42, 96-98 (1996) (stating that every year, approximately 12,000 reports of
adverse reactions are made to the Food and Drug Administration-including hospital
izations, irreversible brain damage, and death-and, that because upwards of ninety
percent of doctors do not report vaccine reactions, this number may be closer to
120,000).
24. DPT is a series of immunizations for diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus. See
H.R. REp. No. 99-908, at 6, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.AN. 6344, 6347. Known compli
cations and injuries arising from the DTP vaccine include anaphylaxis, anaphylactic
shock, shock-collapse or hypotonic-hyporesponsive collapse, residual seizure disorder,
and encephalopathy. See 42 U.S.c. § 300aa-14(a) (1994).
25. H.R. REp. No. 99-908, at 6, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.AN. 6344, 6347.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See Press Release, American Academy of Pediatrics Washington Office, Vac
cine Injury Compensation Program: Helping Children and Families (Sept. 28, 1999),
available at http://www.aap.orgladvocacy/washinglvacinjcomp.htm (stating that before
the introduction of the Vaccine Act, many vaccine manufacturers stopped producing
certain vaccines due to potential liability issues and, "[a]s a result, vaccine supplies
dwindled, endangering the health and safety of the nation's children").
29. H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.AN. 6344, 6345.
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creasing price of vaccines, prompted Congress to act.30 In 1986,
Congress passed the Vaccine Act as a means of compensating vic
tims of vaccine-related injuries,31 and prioritizing vaccine safety and
progress. 32 The Act provides compensation for victims of vaccine
related injuries33 while allowing the victims, at their option, to re
ject the compensation and proceed to trial.3 4
As a means of clarifying and expediting claims of vaccine inju
ries, Congress included the Initial Injury Table. 35 Following the Ini
30. Congress' findings were as follows:
1. The availability and use of vaccines to prevent childhood diseases is among
the Nation's top public health priorities.
2. The Federal government has the responsibility to ensure that all children in
need of immunization have access to them and to ensure that all children who
are injured by vaccines have access to sufficient compensation for their
injuries.
3. Private or non-governmental activities have proven inadequate in achieving
either of these goals.
4. Current economic conditions have resulted in an unstable and unpredictable
childhood vaccine market, making the threat of vaccine shortages a real
possibility.
5. Because of their cost-effectiveness, the Federal government has an interest
in the development, distribution, and use of vaccines, including those designed
to prevent non-childhood diseases.
Id. at 5, reprinted in 1986 U.S.CC.AN. 6344, 6346.
31. Id. at 3, reprinted in 1986 U.S.CCAN. 6344, 6344. Since the Vaccine Act's
promulgation, over 5000 claims for compensation have been received, eighty-five per
cent of which are for vaccines administered prior to the Vaccine Act's effective date of
October 1, 1988. See HEALTH RES. AND SERVS. ADMIN., BACKGROUND INFORMATION
ON VICP, available at http://bhpr.hrsa.gov/vicp/abdvic.htm [hereinafter HRSA).
32. See H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 3-4, reprinted in 1986 U.S.CCAN. 6344, 6344
45; see also HRSA, supra note 31 (stating that suits against DTP vaccine manufacturers
have decreased dramatically since the promulgation of the Vaccine Act, from 255 suits
being filed in 1986 to four suits in 1997).
33. See MILLER, supra note 23, at 46-47 (stating that by August 31, 1997, more
than $302 million had already been paid out under the compensation component of the
Vaccine Act, that thousands of cases are still pending, and that future liability for pre
1988 vaccine injuries could exceed $1.7 billion).
34. 42 U.S.C § 300aa-21(a) (2001). The process for obtaining compensation
under the Vaccine Act requires that a person with an injury resulting from a vaccine
that was administered after enactment of the Vaccine Act must file a compensation
petition and go through the compensation program before proceeding with any litiga
tion against the vaccine manufacturer. If the victims, after compensation proceedings
are complete, are dissatisfied with the award, they may reject the proceeding's findings
and seek compensation through the courts. H.R. REp. No. 99-908, at 17, reprinted in
1986 U.S.CCAN. 6344, 6358. Vaccine Act data shows that only a small percentage of
victims reject the award. See HRSA, supra note 31 (stating that out of 3142 vaccine
injury claims adjudicated through 1995, only seventy claimants have filed motions to
reject the award).
35. The claimant need not have an injury that falls under this Table. The Vaccine
Act provides two ways for claimants to receive compensation: first, by showing they
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tial Injury Table is a list of Qualifications and Aids in
Interpretation36 (QAIs) that provide explanations of and defini
tions for the terms within the Table. Because Congress also real
ized that this Initial Injury Table and the QAIs were going to prove
incomplete as new scientific data was developed, Congress included
.a clause that allows the Secretary to revise the Initial Injury Table
and QAIs.37 This section also allows for revision recommendations
to be made by the Advisory Commission on Childhood Vaccines or
any other person. 38 . Unless clearly frivolous, these recommenda
tions are submitted to the Secretary for review, and the Secretary is
required either to conduct it rulemaking proceeding or to publish
reasons for not conducting such a proceeding.39 Any modifications
made to the Initial Injury Table or QAIs apply only to petitions
filed for compensation after the modification is made. 40
In 1995, the Secretary modified the Initial Injury Table and
QAIs.41 Two of the changes made by the Secretary in the 1995 revi
sion were the elinlination of Residual Seizure Disorder (RSD) from
the Initial Injury Table and a change in the definition for en
cephalopathy.42 These regulations went into effect on March 10,
1995,43 and Terran filed her claim on July 12, 1995.44
suffered a "table injury" (an injury listed on the Injury Table) or by proving causation in
fact (thereby not precluding traditional tort remedies). 42 U.S.c. § 300aa-ll(a) (2001).
36. Id. § 300aa-14(b).·
.
37. [d.; H.R. REp. No. 99-908, at 23, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344,6364.
38. H.R. Rep. No. 99-908, at 23, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6364.
39. [d.
'
.
40. 42 U.S.c. § 300aa-14(c) (1994). The statute reads:
(1) The Secretary may promulgate regulations to modify in accordance with
paragraph (3) the Vaccine Injury Table ....
(2) Any person (including the Advisory Commission on Childhood Vaccines)
may petition the Secretary to propose regulations to amend the Vaccine Injury
Table ....
(3) A modification of the Vaccine Injury Table under paragraph (1) may add
to, or delete from, the list of injuries, disabilities, illnesses, conditions, and
deaths for which compensation may be provided or may change the time peri
ods for the first symptom or manifestation of the onset of the significant aggra
vation of any such injury, disability, illness, condition, or death.
(4) Any modification under paragraph (1) of the Vaccine Injury Table shall
apply only with respect to petitions for compensation under the Program,
which are filed after the effective date of such regulation.
[d.

41. 42 c.P.R. §100.3 (1995). These modifications are at the heart of the issue to
be discussed in Part II of this note.
42. Compare 42 U.S.c. § 300aa-14(a)-(b) (1994), with 42 C.F.R § 100.3 (1996).
43. Terran v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 195 P.3d 1302, 1308 (Fed. Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 812 (2000).
44.

[d.
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B.

The Presentment Clause

In 1787, fifty-five delegates from eleven states met in Philadel.,
phia. 45 Among those present were the nation's most prominent
leaders and statesmen, including George Washington, who was
elected president of the convention, James Madison, Alexander
Hamilton, and Benjamin Franklin. 46 These delegates assembled to
remedy problems with the existing Articles of Confederation but
opted instead to create an entirely new Constitution. 47
The ensuing adoption of the Constitution resulted in a division
of the United States federal government into three separate but in
terdependent branches-the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches. 48 The Framers of the Constitution chose to divide the
government because of a fundamental fear of an overly strong cen
tral government, to safeguard against tyranny, and to promote effi
ciency.49 By separating the powers of the federal government, the
Framers put "checks and balances" on each branch of the govern
menpo The President has the power to veto any law that Congress
passes; Congress may, in turn, override the veto by a two-thirds ma
jority vote in both houses. 51 Finally, judicial branch review ensures
that all laws passed are constitutiona1. 52
One incarnation of the principle of separation of powers is the
Presentment Clause53 of the Constitution. The Presentment Clause
requires that every bill passed by Congress be presented to the
President. 54 The President either signs the bill or returns it to Con
gress. 55 The Presentment Clause further states that if the President
returns the bill, Congress can override the veto with a two-thirds
majority vote in both the Senate and House of Representatives. 56
45. Lance Banning, The Constitutional Convention, in THE FRAMING AND RATI
FICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 112 (Leonard W. Levy & Dennis J. Mahoney eds.,
1987).
46. Id. at 112, 120, 131.
47. Id. at 113.
48. Ralph A. Rossum, The Courts and Judicial Power, in THE FRAMING AND
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 45, at 229.
49. GERARD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 354
(13th ed. 1997).

50.

Id.

51. Judith A. Best, The Presidency and the Executive Power, in THE FRAMING
AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 45, at 217.

52.

Id.

53.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, d. 2.

54.
55.

Id.
Id. (returning the bill is commonly referred to as a Presidential Veto).
Id.

56.
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The presidential veto power gives the President an important de
fensive weapon against legislative intrusions on the power of the
Executive. 57 Concern over precisely this instrusion was noted by
the Founding Fathers. 58
A recent Supreme Court decision interpreting the Presentment
Clause and discussing the separation of powers principle is INS v.
Chadha,59 which found that a provision of the Immigration and Na
tionality Act of 1952 violated the Presentment Clause. 6o In
Chadha, the Supreme Court examined the history of the Present
ment Clause and noted that requiring all legislation to be presented
to the President before becoming law was uniformly accepted by all
of the Framers of the Constitution. 61 The Court stated, "[i]t
emerges clearly that the prescription for legislative action in article
I, sections one and seven represents the Framers' decision that the
legislative power of the Federal government be exercised in accord
with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, proce
dure."62 The Court then noted that not every action taken by the
House is subject to the Presentment Clause. 63 Only those actions
that are properly regarded as legislative in character and effect are
subject to it. 64 The Court found that because article I, section 8,
clause 4 of the Constitution authorizes Congress to establish a uni
form Rule of Naturalization, any action the House took in regard to
naturalization procedures is a legislative act and subject to the Pre
sentment Clause. 65 The Court found· that the section of the Immi
gration Act allowing the House to veto, without presentment to the
57. Consumer Energy Council v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d 425,
461 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
58. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) ("In republican government,
the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is
to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, ... as little con
nected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common
dependence on the society will admit.").
59. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Chadha was foreign-born and entered the United States
on a non-immigrant visa which subsequently expired. An immigration judge, acting on
the authority of the Attorney General, suspended Chadha's deportation. The Immigra
tion and Nationality Act provides that if the Senate or House passes a resolution
against suspension, the Attorney General must deport the alien. The House did pass a
resolution opposing Chadha's deportation suspension, and Chadha was deported. Id. at
923-28.
60. Id. at 946.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 951.
63. Id. at 952.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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Presidept, the Attorn~y General's decision to allow an alien to re
main in the country violated the explicit procedures set forth in the
Constitution and was, therefore, unconstitutiona1. 66
The decision in Chadha and the intent of the Framers as evi
denced by the Federalist Papers both show that the purpose of the
Presentment Clause was to establish a method of checking the
power of the legislative branch. 67 This was done so that the legisla
tive branch would not become the. solitary source of federal
power. 68

II.
A.

THE PRINCIPAL CASE

Terran v. Secretary of Health and Human Services:
Background

Julie F. Terran was born in apparently good health on February
10, 1992, in Phoenix, Arizona. 69 Her score on the Apgar70 test was
an eight/nine out of ten when she was discharged from the hospital
on February 11, 1992. Julie received her first DPT vaccine on
March 27,1992, her second on June 3, 1992, her third on August 10,
1992, and her fourth (an acellular DPT vaccine) on September 22,
1993.71 The August vaccine, Julie's third, was the only one at issue
in the present case.72
On August 11,1992, Julie suffered a seizure that lasted approx
imately seven seconds and caused one·of her arms to become stiff.73
.on August 12, Julie experienced four more afebrile seizures, each
lasting roughly one minute. Julie was immediately rushed by ambu
lance to Phoenix's Children's Hospital at the Good Samaritan Med
ical Center. Along the way, paramedics observed Julie to be alert
66. Id. at 957-58 (fmding unconstitutionality because, by not presenting their ac
tion to the President for approval, the House had taken legislative action without fol
lowing the steps outlined in the Presentment Clause).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Terran v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 41 Fed. Cl. 330, 331-32 (1998),
affd, 195 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 812 (2000).
70. Id. The Apgar test, named for Dr. Virginia Apgar, measures physical traits of
infants, such as heartbeat, respiratory effort, and muscle tone. As newborns are unable
to communicate that something hurts or does not feel right, the test is a means to deter
mine the health of the child. The best Apgar score is a ten. [d. at 332 n.2.
71. Id. at 332.
72. Prior to the third vaccine, Julie had a meningocele lump removed from her
skull, but tests, also completed before the third vaccine, indicated that she had no brain
abnormalities. On May 18, 1992, an MRI scan reported her brain structure as normal
and a biopsy concluded that the removed lump was not cancerous. Id.
73. Id..
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and active; in fact, she was playing with her oxygen mask. The hos
pital admitted Julie and she remained there for observation until
August 14, 1992.
On August 13, 1992, while at the hospital, Julie experienced a
seizure that lasted for five and one-half minutes. The hospital pre
scribed Phenobarbital,74 but the seizures continued throughout the
next year. On September 12, 1992, Julie suffered a seizure that
lasted almost fifty minutes despite her being on Phenobarbital at
the time. Julie's seizures were continuing as of the date of trial. In
addition, she suffers from mental retardation.7 5
On July 12, 1995, Michelle Terran filed a petition for compen
sation under the Vaccine Act on behalf of minor Julie Terran.76 The
Special Master for the United States Court of Federal Claims de
nied compensation under the Vaccine Act.77 On appeal to the
United States Court of Federal Claims, it was alleged that Julie suf
fers from RSD and encephalopathy as defined prior to the 1995
modification of the Initial Injury Table. 78 The court recognized that
Julie would have been able to recover had she brought her petition
prior to the modification, but decided that under the current Re
vised Injury Table, Julie could not recover under the Vaccine Act. 79
On appeal to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, Julie con
tended that the Vaccine Act was not constitutionally valid since it
permitted the Secretary to modify portions of a statute in violation
of the Presentment Clause of the Constitution. 80 The court denied
Julie's appeal, despite a strong dissent. 81
B.

The Majority Opinion

Terran's constitutional challenge to the Vaccine Act alleged
that section 300aa-14(c) of the Act, which authorizes the Secretary
to alter the Initial Injury Table,82 violated the Presentment Clause
74. Phenobarbital is an anti-convulsant. Id.
75. Id.; see also 42 U.S.c. § 300aa-14(b) (1994) (stating that encephalopathy may
result in various degrees of permanent impairment.)
76. Terran, 41 Fed. CI. at 332.
77. Id. For the jurisdiction mandated by the Vaccine Act, see 42 U.S.C. § 300aa
12 (2001).
78. Terran, 41 Fed. CI. at 334.
79. Id. at 335.
80. Terran v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 195 F.3d 1302, 1305 (Fed. Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 812 (2000); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, d. 2.
81. See Terran, 195 F.3d at 1302.
82. 42 U.S.c. § 300aa-14(c)(1) (1994).
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of the Constitution. 83 By allowing the Secretary, in effect, to amend
and repeal portions of a statute, the plaintiff argued, Congress had
bypassed the presentment conditions required of legislative acts by
the Presentment Clause. 84
In response to that claim, the Court of Appeals acknowledged
that the Constitution does not allow members of the executive
branch to enact,85 amend,86 or repeal87 statutes. Such power is
vested exclusively in Congress and the exercise of such legislative
power must follow the procedures set forth in the Constitution. 88
The court looked at the Secretary's' actions not as an amendment of
a statute, but as the promulgation of an administrative ruly89 en
tirely in the discretion of the executivel?ranch. 90
The court first stated that the Vaccine Act does not explicitly
allow the Secretary to amend the Initial Injury Table because the
Initial Injury Table is still on the books and. continues to apply to all
petitions filed prior to the existence of the 1995 Revised Injury Ta
ble.91 The court looked instead at the section in question92 as au
thorizing the Secretary to promulgate an entirely new Vaccine
Injury Table that applies only prospectively.93
The court stated that Congress enacted the Initial Injury Table
knowing that the Table contained ·flaws. 94 It was Congress' intent
that the Secretary should commission studies on the links between
vaccines and injuries, create a panel to oversee the collection of
data on vaccine-related injuries, and revise the Initial Injury Table
83.
84.
85.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
Terran, 195 F.3d at 1312.
"Enact" is defined as "to establish by law; to perform or effect; to decree."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 526 (6th ed. 1990).
86. "Amend" is defined as "to improve; to change for the better by removing
defects or faults; to change, correct, revise." Id. at 80.
87. "Repeal" is defined as "the abrogation or annulling of a previously existing
law by the enactment of a subsequent statute Which declares that the former law shall
be revoked or abrogated or which contains provisions so contrary to or irreconcilable
with those of the earlier law that.only one of the two statutes can stand in force." Id. at
1299.
88. Terran, 195 F.3d at 1312.
89. Administrative rulemaking is, by definition, not a legislative act, but rather an
exercise of executive function properly entrusted to administrative agencies. See Am.
Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 310-13 (1953).
90. Terran, 195 F.3d at 1312.
91. Id.
92. 42 U.s.c. § 300aa-14(c)(I) (1994).
93. Terran, 195 F.3d at 1312.
94. Id. at 1313.
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based on the information obtained from such studies. 95 "Congress
clearly intended the Initial Table would cease to apply to newly
filed petitions when the Secretary promulgated a revised injury ta
ble."96 Therefore, the court reasoned, because the Initial Injury Ta
ble becomes ineffective (not non-existent) upon the Secretary's
promulgation of a revised table, the statutory scheme does not vio
late the intentions of the Presentment Clause. 97
The court found support for its reasoning in Field v. Clark. 98
The court analogized its current decision to Field, decided over a
century before, by reasoning that Congress had anticipated that the
scientific data linking vaccines and injuries may change in the future
and had intended that the Secretary act when more accurate data
became available. 99
The reasoning in Field is echoed in the majority's holding in
Terran. In the majority's view of Field, the President's power to
suspend the provisions of the Tariff Act was contingent on condi
tions that did not exist at the time the law was passed. lOO Likewise,
the Terran court held that the Secretary's power to modify the Ini
tial Injury Table was also contingent on scientific data not known or
95.
96.

Id.
Id.
97. Id.
98. 143 u.S. 649 (1892). The Field case involved Congress' enactment of the
Tariff Act of October 1, 1890 (hereinafter "Tariff Act"), which authorized the President
of the United States to suspend, "for such time as he shall deem just," free importation
under the Tariff Act from any country or countries that impose unfair tariffs on U.S.
exports.
Challengers sought to show that this part of the Tariff Act, in so far as it authorized
the President to suspend provisions of the Act, is unconstitutional as it delegates legisla
tive power to the Executive and violates the Presentment Clause. Their challenge was
rejected. The Supreme Court noted that the concept that Congress cannot delegate
legislative power to the President is a "principle universally recognized as vital to the
integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution."
However, the Act does not invest the President with the power of legislation; rather,
Congress itself determined that the free .introduction of imports to the United States
should be suspended as to any country which the President believes to be unfairly plac
ing tariffs on U.S. exports, and Congress determined duties to be levied on these prod
ucts in the event of suspension. [d. at 692-93. Therefore, the Court reasoned, the Act
required the President to periodically examine the commercial regulations of other
countries producing and exporting these products and form a judgment as to whether
they were reciprocally reasonable and fair. If a country was placing tariffs on U.S.
exports unfairly, the President could issue a proclamation declaring a suspension on the
free import of their goods. The President has no discretion on when to act, only as to
how long the suspension would endure. Obedience to legislative will is not a legislative
function reserved for Congress. [d. at 693.
99. Terran, 195 F.3d at 1313.
100.

[d.
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realized at the time the Vaccine Act was passed. Due to this, Con
gress anticipated that the facts underlying its legislation (the scien
tific data linking various injuries to vaccinations) might change in
the future. 1OI
Further, the Terran majority noted that in Field, the President
had the discretion to determine when another· country was placing
unfair tariffs on U.S. exports and to determine how long suspen
sions would endure under the Tariff Act.1 02 The Terran majority
explained that, under the Vaccine Act, the Secretary has similar dis
cretion to promulgate a Revised Injury Table.103 To illustrate the
shared narrow discretion, the court noted that the Vaccine Act re
quires the Secretary to act when new scientific data comes to his
attention or when a person petitions for a modification of the Initial
Injury Table; similarly, the Tariff Act required the President to or
der a suspension when he determined that another country was act
ing unfairly.1 04 Concluding that the Field decision applied to the
challenge in Terran, the majority found that the Vaccine Act was
not in violation of the Presentment Clause.105
Terran also raised Clinton v. City of New York lO6 in her chal
lenge to the Vaccine Act, but the majority in Terran found the deci
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id. at 1314.
Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. 524 U.S. 417 (1998). The Line Item Veto Act (hereinafter "Veto Act") gives
the President the power to cancel certain discretionary spending provisions within five
days of the bill being signed into law, subject to restrictions such as consideration of the
legislative history, the purposes of the provision, and other relevant information about
the provision. 2 U.S.C. §§ 691(e)(4)(B)-(C), (b) (Supp. II 1996). The Supreme Court
found that the Veto Act violated the Presentment Clause. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 421. The
Court recognized that there is no provision in the Constitution that authorizes the Pres
ident to enact, amend, or repeal statutes; he may influence and initiate legislative pro
posals, but he may not modify existing laws. Id. at 438. The President must either sign
or return a bill that has passed both Houses of Congress, according to the Presentment
Clause. Id. The Court noted that there are important differences between the return of
the bill pursuant to the Presentment Clause and the exercise of the President's cancella
tion under the Veto Act. The constitutional return takes place before the bill becomes
a law, while the statutory cancellation occurs after the bill has become law. The Court
then stated that "although the Constitution expressly authorizes the President to playa
role in the process of enacting statutes, it is silent on the subject of unilateral Presiden
tial action that either repeals or amends parts of duly enacted statutes." Therefore, the
Supreme Court concluded that the Veto Act violated the Presentment Clause by giving
the President the power to repeal items of a statute. The President is, in effect, creating
a new statute without having it pass through both Houses of Congress. Clinton, 524
U.S. at 420-39.
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sion in Clinton was inapplicable to the case before them.107 In
Clinton, the Supreme Court held that the Line Item Veto Act was
an unconstitutional violation of the Presentment Clause. 108 The
Terran majority agreed with the Clinton Court that the Constitution
does not authorize the President to enact, amend, or repeal stat
utes. 109 The Terran majority noted key differences, however, be
tween the facts and law raised in Clinton, those raised in Field, and
those raised in the case before them. l1O
Initially, the Terran court reiterated that in the Tariff Act in
Field, and in the Vaccine Act, Congress had anticipated that the
facts underlying its legislation might change in the future and had
formulated the statute to accommodate those changes.111 In the
Veto Act, at issue in Clinton, because there was only a five-day time
period in which the President could exercise his power to cancel
provisions in legislative enactments, any action the President took
would have to be based on the same conditions contemplated by
.
Congress. 112
Next, the Terran majority noted that the Veto Act provided
little constraint on the President's discretion to cancel a portion of a
statute.1 13 In Field, however, the Tariff Act had limited the Presi
dent's discretion to declare a suspension.1 14 Accordingly, the Ter
ran majority found the Vaccine Act to be more closely related to
the Tariff Act than the Veto Act. l1S Although the Secretary has the
ultimate discretion in revising the Initial Injury Table, the Vaccine
Act requires not only that the Secretary respond to petitions by any
persons, regarding the Initial Injury Table, but it also sets forth pro
cedural requirements that govern any modification the Secretary
may make, thereby somewhat limiting the Secretary's discretion. 116
Finally, the Terran majority noted that, in Field, it was pre
sumed that the President was fulfilling congressional policy when
he declared a suspension under the Tariff Act. 117 In Clinton, how
107.
108.
109.
110.

111.
tionships
112.

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Terran, 195 F.3d at 1314.
Clinton, 524 U.S. at 448-49.
Terran, 195 F.3d at 1312.
Id.
For example, scientists could uncover new information regarding the rela
between various vaccines and injuries associated with them. Id. at 1313.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1314.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ever, the President was clearly contravening congressional policy by
canceling spending items Congress had just passed.1 18 The Terran
majority found that the Vaccine Act more closely aligned with the
Tariff Act, as it seemed to be Congressional policy that the Secre
tary subsequently modifies the Initial Injury Table. 119 Due to this
fidelity to congressional intent, the Terran court held that the analy
sis used in Field was more applicable than the analysis used in
Clinton. 120
The majority concluded that under the Vaccine Act, the Secre
tary does not have the power to alter or amend the Act itself. In
stead, the Secretary only has the power to promulgate a revised
table that is in accord with current scientific data. Thus, the Secre
tary's action is not a violation of the Presentment Clause. 121
C.

The Dissenting Opinion

The basis of Judge Plager's dissent was his strong disagreement
with the majority's conclusion that the Vaccine Act did not grant
the Secretary the ability to amend and repeal a statute in violation
of the Presentment Clause. 122 Judge Plager recognized that in or
der for a bill to become a law it must first pass through both Houses
of Congress and then be presented to the President of the United
States for approval or veto. Neither House acting alone, nor the
President or any other member of the executive branch, may consti
tutionally enact, amend, or repeal statutes. 123 By permitting the ex
ecutive branch to make the amendment to the Injury Table, Judge
Plager contended, Congress is providing for the amendment of oth
erwise valid, enforceable, and existing legislation in a manner con
trary to the intention of the Constitution. 124
Judge Plager drew on Clinton v. City of New York 125 when not
ing that the Supreme Court has recognized and made clear that any
amendment or modification of a statute must follow the exact pro
cedures defined in the Presentment Clause. 126 Judge Plager relied
on the Clinton Court's analysis in his assertion that the Vaccine Act
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
holding).
126.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1317 (Plager, J., dissenting).
Id. (Plager, J., dissenting).
Id. (Plager, J., dissenting).
524 U.S. 417 (1998); see supra note 106 (providing Clinton facts and
Terran, 195 F.3d at 1319 (Plager, J., dissenting).
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does violate the Presentment Clause.1 27 Judge Plager found Clin
ton applicable, not only because it was a Supreme Court decision
decided only one year before, but also because the Court in Clinton
had made it clear that any modification to a statute must follow the
procedures set forth in the Presentment Clause.1 28 Judge Plager
reasoned that the Supreme Court in Clinton had found that the
President had legally and effectively amended an act of Congress by
repealing a portion of it and that the cancellation of one section of a
statute may be the equivalent of a partial repeal even if a portion of
the section is not cancelled. 129 Judge Plager determined that the
Secretary was basically doing the same thing, amending an act of
Congress by repealing a portion of it (the Initial Injury Table).130
Judge Plager disagreed with the majority in Terran by reason
ing that because the Vaccine Act gives the Secretary the unilateral
power to modify an existing statute (the Initial Injury Table), it is in
violation of the bicameralism and presentment guidelines set forth
by the Presentment Clause.13 1 Judge Plager examined the major
ity's contention that this is not a modification of an existing statute,
but merely promulgation of a new regulation that only nullifies that
existing statute.132 He concluded. that the majority's unstated pre
mise was that an amendment that leaves an earlier provision unre
pealed means that the earlier provision was not amended. 133 He
pointed out that in almost all cases where Congress changes an ex
isting law, the provisions of the original statute still apply to cases
arising prior to the effective date of the change.134 Therefore,
Judge Plager reasoned, when Congress changes a statute, it does
not amend it unless the provision it is changing is totally repealed
with retroactivity.135
Judge Plager stated that as a result of the Secretary's promul
gation of the 1995 Revised Injury Table, the Initial Injury Table was
no longer effective and that the Secretary had deleted a portion of a
statute that would have been available to Julie Terran.136 There
fore, the Secretary had amended a statute by repealing a portion of
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

(Plager, J., dissenting).
(Plager, J., dissenting).
at 1320 (Plager, J., dissenting).
(Plager, J., dissenting).
at 1319 (Plager, J., dissenting).
at 1319-20 (Plager, J., dissenting).
at 1320 (Plager, J., dissenting).
(Plager, J., dissenting).
(Plager, J., dissenting).
(Plager, J., dissenting).
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it, even if that portion was still on the books.137 The Vaccine Act
gives the Secretary complete authority to modify the Initial Injury
Table that was included within the statute, and, as a result, the Sec
retary was modifying that statute without having to go through the
steps required by the Presentment Clause.1 38 Judge Plager stated
that he would have found the 1995 Revised Injury Table to be with
out legal effect, thereby allowing Terran to recover. 139
III.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

Section 300aa-14(c), the Vaccine Act, authorizes the Secretary
to issue a Revised Injury Table that renders the Initial Injury Table
inapplicable to subsequent petitions filed under the Vaccine Act.140
Whether or not the Secretary's power violates the Presentment
Clause of the Constitution has faced little scrutiny in the courts.
The Terran court, the only court to decide the issue, held that
"[s]ection 300aa-14(c)of the Vaccine Act does not violate the Pre
sentment Clause. "141 This analysis will examine both sides of the
issue, to determine whether the Vaccine Act violates the Present
ment Clause and to determine available solutions. The analysis be
gins by distinguishing between functional and formalistic views of
the separation of powers concept, as well as discussing the potential
delegation of power issue involved in the Secretary's actions. This
will be followed by application of these ideologies to the present
issue and a determination of the correct outcome. In conclusion,
there will be a brief discussion of constitutionally. permitted
alternatives.
A.

Form Versus Function: In General

The form versus function debate has been a long-standing tra
dition throughout American jurisprudence. In its basic form, the
question is whether courts ought to follow the exact, literal wording
of a statute or manipulate a statute to accommodate a situation that
perhaps the authors of the statute did not foresee? This debate is as
prevalent when it comes to separation of powers as it is in any other
field. Should courts respect a complete separation of power be
tween the executive, legislative, and judicial branches? Or, should
137.

138.
139.

140.
141.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1320-21 (Plager, J., dissenting).
at 1321 (Plager, J., dissenting).
(Plager, J., dissenting).
at 1308.
at 1314.
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they allow the branches to commingle their powers to promote effi
ciency in a modern United States that the Framers of the Constitu
tion perhaps did not envision when promulgating this document?
1.

The Formalistic Approaches

When the founders convened to create the Constitution, there
was a fundamental fear of government. This fear presumably arose
from the tyrannical control of Great Britain, from which they had
recently fled, and led them to distribute the powers of the federal
government among three branches with distinct duties and respon
sibilities. 142 Each branch, in addition to the exclusive powers and
duties granted it, was given the power to "check" the other
branches of the government. 143 For example, if Congress passes an
act, the President may sign it or veto it, thus creating an executive
"check" over the legislative function.1 44
A formalistic view of the separation. of powers concept re
quires that courts examine the words of the Constitution to see if
the text permits the challenged action. Under the formal view, a
statute that allows a member of the executive branch to employ
legislative power will be struck down because it violates the separa
tion of powers principle.
An example of the formal view is the position taken by the
Supreme Court in Clinton,145 where the Court held the Line Item
Veto Act unconstitutional as a violation of the Presentment
Clause. 146 A fundamental principle of separation of powers is
found within the Presentment Clause, which requires that every act
passed by Congress must be presented to the President before it
will have the force of law. 147 The majority in Clinton, led by Justice
Stevens, adopted the formal approach in its opinion when it found
that the Veto Act's grant of power to the President violated the
express words of the Presentment Clause. 148 In finding that the
Veto Act authorized action in violation of the Presentment Clause,
142. See DAAN BRAVEMAN ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: STRUCTURE AND
RIGHTS IN OUR FEDERAL SYSTEM 58 (4th ed. 2000).
143. Id. at 56.
144. Id. at 91.
145. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998); see supra note 106 and
accompanying text.
146. Clinton, 524 U.S. at448.
147. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
148. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 439-40. "What has emerged in these cases from the Pres
ident's exercise of his statutory cancellation powers [of the Veto Act], however, are
truncated versions of two bills that passed both Houses of Congress. They are not the
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Justice Stevens noted that the only options the President has with
respect to an act passed by Congress and presented to him is to
approve it or veto it.1 49 One year later, following the majority opin
ion in Clinton, Judge Plager's dissent in Terran I50 utilized the for
mal approach in urging that the Vaccine Act is also in violation of
the text of the Presentment Clause.1 51
The formalistic view of separation of powers has been applied
in other situations I52 and seems to be the trend of the Supreme
Court after their decision in Clinton. In Terran, the dissenting opin
ion utilized formalistic reasoning,153 but the majority decided the
Presentment Clause. issue before them following a functional
approach. 154
2.

The Functionalist Approach

The functional approach developed because of a perceived
need to promote efficiency among the branches of the govern
ment. 155 In essence, this approach allows power reserved for one
branch of the government to be exercised by a member of another
branch.1 56 The underpinning for the modern functionalist approach
was stated by Justice Breyer in his dissent in Clinton, where he
noted that at the time the United States was founded and the Con
stitution written, the population was less than four million, there
were fewer than five thousand federal employees, and the annual
budget totaled approximately four million dollars. 157 In contrast,
product of the 'finely wrought' procedure that the Framers designed." Id. (quoting INS
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)) (citation omitted).
149. Id. at 440.
1.50. Terran v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 195 F.3d 1302, 1317 (Fed. Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 812 (2000) (Plager, J., dissenting). See discussion supra
Part I.C; see also infra Part II1.B.3 (discussing Judge Plager's dissenting opinion in more
detail).
151. Terran, 195 F.3d at 1319-21 (Plager,J., dissenting).
152. See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 73
74, 87 (1982) (striking down the 1978 revisions to the Bankruptcy Act, which allowed
Article I bankruptcy judges to perform the same judicial functions as Article III judges,
because the Constitution did not specifically grant jurisdiction to Article I bankruptcy
judges to hear issues involving public rights).
153. Terran, 195 F.3d at 1317-21 (Plager, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 1312-14.
155. See id. at 1312 (stating that the Presentment Clause is inapplicable to admin
istrative rulemaking, even though agencies are technically part of the administrative
branch, because "rulemaking is by definition not a legislative act, but rather an act of
executive function properly entrusted").
156. Id. at 1312; Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 470 (1998) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
157. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 470 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Justice Breyer continued, the current U.S. population is approxi-.
mat ely two hundred and fifty million, there are over four million
federal employees, and an annual budget of over one and a half
trillion dollars.I58 Justice Breyer believed that, given this extreme
change in circumstances coupled with the "Framers' pragmatic vi
sion," the Constitution allows for "necessary institutional innova
tion."159 Congress may use novel means to accomplish a
constitutionally legitimate end, even if such means is the delegation
of some of its power to another branch of the government. 160
The Constitution provides that "[a]ll legislative Powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States."161 The
Supreme Court, in interpreting this language, has derived the
"nondelegation doctrine," which mandates that Congress may not
delegate its legislative powers to any other branch of govern
ment. 162 The influence of functionalists within the Supreme Court
has led it to the creation of exceptions to the nondelegation doc
trine. 163 Delegations are exempted from violating separation of
powers principles so long as Congress "lay[s] down by legislative act
an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to
[act] is directed to conform ...."164 Therefore, Congress may dele
gate its legislative power so long as it requires the branch exercising
the power to follow standards that can be labeled by the Court as
"intelligible principles. "165
Functionalists, therefore, have succeeded in implanting their
approach into American jurisprudence, most notably by the excep
tion to the nondelegation doctrine. Some authors believe this ap
158. Id. at 471 (Breyer, I., dissenting).
159. Id. at 472 (Breyer, I., dissenting).
160. Id. at 472-73 (Breyer, I., dissenting).
161. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
162. Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991) ("The nondeiegation doc
trine is rooted in the principle of separation of powers that underlies our tripartite sys
tem of Government.") (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989».
163. "The Constitution permits Congress to 'see[k] assistance from another
branch' of Government, the 'extent and character' of that assistance to be fixed 'accord
ing to common sense and the inherent necessities of the governmental co-ordination.'"
See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 484 (Breyer, I., dissenting) (quoting I.W. Hampton, Ir. & Co. v.
United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928».
164. J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co., 276 U.S. at 409.
165. See, e.g., Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,225-26 (1943) (up
holding delegation to the Federal Communications Commission to regulate broadcast
licensing as "public interest, convenience, or necessity" requires); Fed. Powers Comm'n
v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 600-03 (1944) (upholding delegation to the
Federal Power Commission to determine "just and reasonable" rates).
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proach to be both important and unavoidable. 166 The division of
courts in adopting the formal versus functional approach is on-go
ing and is nowhere more apparent than in the Terran case.
B.

Form versus Function: The Vaccine Act and the Presentment
Clause

The Vaccine Act at issue in Terran prompts the same questions
as do most separation of powers issues: Does the Vaccine Act vio
late the express language of the Constitution? Even if the Vaccine
Act does violate such express language, is it possibly a constitution
ally legitimate delegation of power?
1.

The Vaccine Act Does Not Violate the Presentment
Clause

The majority in Terran stated that the main reason that the
Vaccine Act does not violate the Presentment Clause is that when
the Secretary promulgates the Revised Injury Table, the Initial In
jury Table is not repealed, amended, or evert modified. 167 The Ini
tial Injury Table is still on the books and is still effective to petitions
for relief that have been filed prior to the promulgation of the Re
vised Injury Table. 168 This reasoning may seem to be an issue of
semantics, but it is how the Supreme Court has responded to Pre
sentment Clause challenges in the past.1 69
In the Field case, the Supreme Court found that, because the
Tariff Act envisioned a change in circumstances and required the
President to suspend free importation when another country began
to tax U.S. exports unfairly, it did not violate the Presentment
166. See Peter L. Strauss, Bowsher v. Synar: Formal and Functional Approaches
to Separation·oJ-Powers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488
(1987).
[I]n 1987, [merger of function between the branches of the government] is
unavoidable given Congress's need to delegate at some level the making of
policy for a complex and interdependent economy .... Respect for [the]
"framers' intent" is only workable in the context of the actual present, and
may require some selectivity in just what it is we choose'to respect-the open
ended text, the indeterminacy of governmental form, the vision of a changing
future, and the general purpose to avoid tyrannical government, rather than a
particular three-part model.
Id. at 493.
167. Terran v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 195 F.3d 1302, 1312 (Fed. Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 812 (2000).
168. Id.
169. See, e.g., Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 693 (1892).
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Clause. I7o Both the Tariff Act in Field and the Vaccine Act in Ter
ran authorize a member of the executive branch to effectively can
cel an existing statute. l7l In the case of the Tariff Act, the executive
branch member would be canceling a statute that implements the
free importation of goods from certain countries. I72 Similarly,
under the Vaccine Act, the executive branch member would be in
effect canceling the Initial Injury Table by promUlgating the Re
vised Injury Table. I73 These parallels may be the reason the major
ity in Terran relied on the Field decision in its opinion.
The difficulties with the Field decision are its age, having been
decided 108 years ago, and that it did not involve the actual modifi
cation of a statute that Terran did. Under the Vaccine Act, the Sec
retary was authorized to' promulgate a Revised Injury Table, while
under the Tariff Act, the President was authorized to declare a sus
pensionY4 The difference is only a matter of the weight that can be
given to a written regulation. Also, under the Tariff Act, the Presi
dent was required to act upon certain conditions;I75 whereas, the
Vaccine Act gives the Secretary discretion as to whether and when
to revise the table. I76 Another distinction between the Tariff Act
and the Vaccine Act is that the Tariff Act allowed the President to
only temporarily suspend free importation of goods from certain
countries. Under the Vaccine Act, however, the Secretary's promul
gation of a Revised Injury Table effectively cancels the Initial Table
for all subsequent petitions for relief.
Under the reasoning in Field, it seems as though the Supreme
Court of 1892 would have decided the issue in Terran the way the
majority did. But, we are at a time when the Supreme Court has a
wealth of knowledge and precedent at its disposal, some of which
suggests that the decision in Terran would be decided differently if
it were before the Court today.
Several authors have criticized the reasoning in Clinton in a
manner that lends credit to the Terran resultY7 One author argues
170. Id. at 693.
171. Terran, 195 F.3d at 1320-21 (Plager, J., dissenting).
172. See Field, 143 U.S. at 680-94.
173. Terran, 195 F.3d at 1320-21 (Plager, J., dissenting).
174. Field, 143 U.S. at 680.
175. Id.
176. Terran, 195 F.3d at 1318 (Plager, J., dissenting).
177. See, e.g., Thomas Charles Woodworth, Note, Meet the Presentment Clause:
Clinton v. New York, 60 LA. L. REV. 349, 363 (1999) (stating that the Supreme Court
erred in its decision in Clinton because once the bill was signed into law and the Presi
dent cancelled a provision under the Veto Act, the 'Presentment Clause no longer ap
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that Clinton would have been decided differently under delegation
of authority doctrines and that by deciding the case under the Pre
sentment Clause, the Supreme Court effectively avoided the
tougher question of inherent separation of powers. 178 Another au
thor points out that historically, the Supreme Court has given
credence to delegation of authority from Congress to the President,
but that in Clinton, the Court seemed to be caught up in the textual
ramifications of the Veto Act. 179 These authors' points are well
taken, but the Court in Clinton reached an opposite result, a result
that should have caused the Terran court to reconsider its
reasoning.
2.

Delegation of Legislative Power and the Vaccine Act

In Terran, the majority incorporated its functionalist view by
concluding that the Vaccine Act's grant of authority to the Secre
tary is a constitutionally permissible delegation of legislative
power. 180 Judge Clevenger noted that for a delegation of legislative
power to be constitutionally legitimate, Congress must "lay down
by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or
body authorized to [act] is directed to conform ...."181
The statutory grant of power seems to leave Vaccine Act Injury
Table revisions in the sole discretion of the Secretary,182 hardly
what a court could find to be an "intelligible principle." Yet the
majority found that the Vaccine Act constrains the Secretary's dis
cretion by requiring that she consult with the Advisory Commission
on Childhood Vaccines before proposing rules to revise the Injury
Table. Therefore, Congress "clearly intended the Secretary to be
guided by the findings from [the Commission's] studies when she
decides to promulgate regulations to revise the injury table."183
If Congress clearly intended the Secretary to be guided by the
plied as it was only applicable to the procedure in which a bill becomes law); see also
Eric Stephen Schmitt, Note, There is No Joy in D.C., the Mighty Court Struck Out: An
Analysis of Clinton v. City of New York, The Line Item Veto Act and the Court's Failure
to Uphold Constitutionally Legitimate Means to a Viable End, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 167,
190 (2000) (stating that the Court's elevation of form over substance was a mistake as
tolerance for government flexibility and innovation is a hallmark of democracy).
178. Woodworth, supra note 177, at 353.
179. Schmitt, supra note 177, at 186-88.
180. Terran, 195 F.3d at 1315.
181. Id. at 1315 (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jf. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,
406 (1928)).
182. 42 U.S.c. § 300aa-14(c) (1994).
183. Terran, 195 F.3d at 1315 (noting that the Advisory Commission is comprised
of health professionals, family members of those suffering vaccine-related injuries, and
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Advisory Commission's findings, would it not have stated so in the
statute? Section 300aa-14(c) only requires that the Secretary accept
petitions for proposed regulations to amend the Injury Tab!e from
the Commission, or any person. 184 The petitions are referred to the
Commission for their recommendation to the Secretary, but there
are no standards to guide the Secretary as to what recommenda
tions to accept; all the statute states is that "the Secretary shall con
duct a rulemaking proceeding on the matters proposed . . . or
publish ... reasons for not conducting such proceeding. "185
Nothing in the statute requires the Secretary to follow a stan
dard in determining what regulations to make.1 86 By the express
words of the statute, the Secretary can either conduct a rule making
proceeding or publish reasons for not doing so, with no guidelines
regarding when to do either. This is hardly what has been deemed
an "intelligible principle" in the past. 187 Based on standards that
have been deemed "intelligible principles" by the Supreme Court in
the past, and on what seems to be a total lack of standards in the
Vaccine Act, the Act does not pass as a constitutionally legitimate
delegation of legislative power.
3.

The Vaccine Act Violates the Presentment Clause

The decision in Clinton indicates that the Supreme Court may
decide the issue in the Terran case differently than the Terran ma
jority did, and may, in fact agree with the dissent.1 88 In Clinton,
which is far more recent than the Field decision, the Court em
braced the formalist approach and recognized that any legislative
action must follow the explicit procedures set forth in the Present
ment Clause of the Constitution.1 89 The Supreme Court deter
mined that an Act authorizing action by the President to cancel
discretionary spending items after a bill has become a law violates
legal representatives who are charged with' the task of gathering information on vac
cine-related injuries).
184. 42 U.S.c. § 300aa-14(c) (1994).
185. Id.
186. See id.
187. E.g., Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190225-26 (1943) (up
holding delegation to the Federal Communications Commission to regulate broadcast
licensing as "public interest, convenience, or necessity" require); Fed. Power Comm'n v.
Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 600-03 (1944) (upholding delegation to the Fed
eral Power Commission to determine "just and reasonable" rates).
188. Terran, 195 F.3d at 1320 (Plager, J., dissenting).
189. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438 (1998).
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the Presentment Clause. 190 The situation presented in Clinton re
sembles that presented in Terran. In Clinton, Congress promul
gated a legislative act that authorized a member of the executive
branch to cancel certain portions of a statute,191 In Terran, Con
gress promulgated a legislative act that authorized a member of the
executive branch to create a regulation that effectively cancels cer
tain portions of a statute. 192 In this basic form, the two cases seem
indistinguishable, but the opinions are in opposition.
The Terran dissent incorporated the same reasoning and for
malist feel as the Supreme Court's in Clinton. 193 Congress, through
section 300aa-14(c) of the Vaccine Act, bypassed the procedural re
quirements of the Presentment Clause by authorizing the Secretary
to promulgate the Revised Injury Table. This effectively repeals the
Initial Injury Table, included in the statute, to all subsequent peti
tions for relief. 194 The Supreme Court in Clinton found that,
through the Veto Act, Congress had bypassed the procedural re
quirements of the Presentment Clause by authorizing the President
to repeal portions of spending statutes. 195 The dissent in Terran
and the Supreme Court majority in Clinton concluded that, as acts
by Congress that allow a member of the executive branch to do
something that, in effect, repeals portions of existing statutes, both
were unconstitutional violations of the Presentment Clause.
Therefore, it seems that if the Supreme Court were to grant
certiorari in a case that presents the same issue as Terran, it would
conclude that the Vaccine Act unconstitutionally violated the Pre
sentment Clause of the Constitution. The reason for this is two
fold: (1) The Clinton case was decided recently, possibly showing
the Court's present disposition; and (2) at their cores, the Clinton
case and the Terran case are nearly identical and therefore the deci
sions would, conceivably, be nearly identical.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court could recognize some
defect in its reasoning in Clinton and implement the reasoning of
the Field decision. This would lead to the same result as the Terran
190. Id. at 449.
191. Id. at 417 (stating that the Veto Act authorized the President to cancel cer
tain discretionary spending provisions in statutes that he had already signed into law).
192. Terran, 195 F.3d at 1308. The Vaccine Act authorizes the Secretary to pro
mulgate a revised Injury Table that effectively makes the Initial Table ineffective to all
petitions filed after the promulgation of the revised table. Id.
193. Terran, 195 F.3d at 1317-21 (Plager, J., dissenting) (relying on the reasoning
from Clinton and citing throughout).
194. Id. at 1320 (Plager, J., dissenting).
195. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 449.
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majority's decision in that the promulgation of the Revised Injury
Table was held to be a legislatively required act that did not effec
tively repeal an existing statute. Consequently, the Initial Injury
Table would still be effective towards all petitions filed prior to the
revision. 196
Realizing that the Supreme Court may not grant certiorari, the
question becomes less what the Supreme Court would decide and
more whether the Terran decision is correct and the Vaccine Act is
in violation of the Presentment Clause in light of prior history and
subjective opinions.
The reasoning the Supreme Court set forth in Clinton seems
logical but has been criticized by several authors. 197 Despite this,
the reasoning set forth by the majority in Terran seems to be based
on a different interpretation of the Presentment Clause when com
pared to that of the Supreme Court in the Clinton case. The Vac
cine Act authorizes the Secretary to promulgate the Revised Injury
Table that effectively repeals the Initial Injury Table (as the Initial
Injury Table ceases to apply to subsequent petitions). Therefore,
the Vaccine Act is no longer the same Act that was passed through
both Houses of Congress and presented to the President. In effect,
it is an altered Act containing an ineffective Initial Injury Table and
a new Revised Injury Table that was not approved by either House
of Congress or the President. One can only speculate as to whether
the modified Vaccine Act would have become a law if it had been
presented as a bill in its present form. Even if the Vaccine Act can
be considered substantively the same as when it was initially
promulgated, there is .still a policy argument against allowing the
provision authorizing the Sec:t:etary's actions to stand. If we allow
this type of legislation authorizing the executive branch to create
new laws, we diminish the effect of the Constitution's system of
checks and balances.
The power to enact statutes may only "be exercised in accord
with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered proce
dure."198 The Framers of the Constitution placed great importance
on the government being divided into the tripartite model, with
each branch retaining powers exclusive and independent of the
other branches as a way to limit power vested in one branch
196.
197.
198.

Terran, 195 F.3d at 1312.
See Woodworth, supra note 177, at 363; Schmitt, supra note 177, at 190.
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
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alone.1 99 After narrowly escaping the tyranny of England, the
Framers clearly wanted to place carefully considered limits on each
branch of the government, allowing no branch to dominate.
The principles of separation of powers are fundamental to the
success of the United States government, so allowing Congress to
bypass the express words of our founding document facilitates a
shift in power that the Framers of the Constitution sought to avoid.
Congress erred in the promulgation of the Vaccine Act because it
allows the Secretary to employ legislative power without employing
an "intelligible principle," something a member of the executive
branc!:t is forbidden from doing under the Constitution.
CONCLUSION

The Terran case presents a new spin on a long debated topic in
American jurisprudence. The Presentment Clause embodies in a
single sentence the essence of the Constitution-the idea of separa
tion of powers and a system of checks and balances. Violations of
the Presentment Clause are necessarily avoided as they are in oppo
sition to the very ideas that enabled the Framers to build a govern
ment-free of tyranny-that would stand the test of time. Even
though the Terran court found that the Vaccine Act did not violate
the Presentment Clause of the Constitution, prior cases and careful
legal analysis indicates that this decision may be decided differently
in another court. Therefore, the Supreme Court may wish to recon
sider whether or not to grant certiorari when this issue arises again.
Congress may also wish to amend the Vaccine Act and set forth
standards the Secretary must employ in making revisions to the In
jury Table. Congress should strive to create standards that may be
deemed "intelligible principles"2°O so that the Vaccine Act contains
a constitutionally legitimate delegation of legislative power. Until
such time, the Vaccine Act's grant of authority to the Secretary re
mains unconstitutional with repercussions that not only threaten

199. See THE FEDERALIST No. 73 (Alexander Hamilton).
200. A standard that has been found to be an "intelligible principle" in the past
and might fit the Vaccine Act situation requires the responsible agency to make regula
tions as "public interest, convenience, or necessity" requires. See Nat'l Broad. Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943) (upholding delegation to the Federal Com
munications Commission to regulate broadcast licensing as "public interest, conve
nience, or necessity" requires).
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our system of government, but also deprive sick children such as
Julie Terran of compensation for their injuries.

Erik Loftus

